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INTRODUCTION
I plan to discuss the dynamics between the introduction of
international humanitarian law and human rights in the context of
two fledgling war crimes courts created within the national judicial
systems of Iraq and Cambodia-two countries not noted for their
adherence to human rights norms in the past. The experiences in Iraq
and Cambodia are important because the future implementation of
. Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit (ret.); Judge,
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (1999-2001); LL.B.
Yale Law School (1951). This article is an expanded version of remarks presented
at a conference on "International Criminal Tribunals in the 21st Century" hosted
by the War Crimes Research Office of the Washington College of Law, American
University, on September 30, 2005.
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international humanitarian law, at least so far as judicial enforcement
is concerned, probably lies in national or hybrid courts located at the
scene of the conflicts and inevitably embedded in the cultural and
political backdrop of the individual countries.
The experience in the Special Court of Sierra Leone, discussed
elsewhere in this symposium,' is also informative but different. In
the Sierra Leone Special Court, a majority of judges are
international, chosen by the United Nations, and the mode of trial
follows that of the ad hoc tribunals and the International Criminal
Court ("ICC"); a basically adversarial, common-law mode of trial
familiar to Westerners. In Iraq and Cambodia, the majority-or in
Iraq's case the totality-of the judges as well as most of the
prosecutors and staff are indigenous. The law applied--except for
the definitions of the universal crimes and some ancillary provisions
taken from international humanitarian law-is predominantly the law
of each respective country, not international law.
Two critical questions arise from this scenario. First, can these
courts function independently and efficiently in their native habitats?
And second, will their presence require or precipitate the recognition
and enforcement of significant human rights norms formerly rejected
or ignored in the regular court national systems? This is an early
point at which to make any confident assessment, but not too early to
present some significant signals worth mentioning.
I. IRAQ'S SPECIAL TRIBUNAL
The Iraqi Special Tribunal ("IST") was established at the end of
2003 in a law ("IST Statute") passed first by the Coalition
Provisional Authority and later re-passed by the Iraqi interim
government.2 The Iraqi Parliament has recently passed the IST
Statute with some amendments as official national law. Iraqi
expatriates and Americans reportedly drafted the original IST Statute
1. See, e.g., David M. Crane, Terrorists, Warlords, and Thugs, 21 AM. U.
INT'LL. REv. 505 (2006).
2. Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal, art. 15, Dec. 10, 2003, 43 I.L.M. 231
(2004) [hereinafter IST Statute].
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and in large part it copies the charters of the ad hoc tribunals3 and the
International Criminal Court ("ICC") 4 with some crucial exceptions I
will discuss. The international community wanted a more
internationalized court-either an ad hoc tribunal like the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia ("ICTY")
or International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda ("ICTR"), or at least
one with significant participation by international judges and
personnel and one approved by the U.N., such as the Sierra Leone
Special Court. Instead, the IST Statute provides for Iraqi judges only,
although there is a provision that a non-Iraqi judge may be appointed
if deemed necessary, but it has not happened and my surmise is that
it will not. The IST has jurisdiction only over Iraqi nationals who
have committed genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes
(along with several national crimes such as wastage of natural
resources, manipulation of the judiciary and abuse of policies leading
to war against Arab neighbors) committed between 1968 and the end
of the Iraq invasion in May 2003.1 The IST must follow Iraqi
criminal procedure law, except as set out in the IST law itself or its
Revised Rules of Procedure and Evidence ("IST Rules").6
I believe it fair to say that the majority of international
humanitarian law concepts adopted by the ad hoc court charters and
the ICC are present in the IST Statute and Rules-at least in the last
versions I have seen. Here I note that many of these provisions are
human rights norms as well as international humanitarian law
principles and I make no pretense at being able to draw sharp
3. E.g., Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) [hereinafter
ICTY Statute]; Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C.
Res. 955, U.N. Doe. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) [hereinafter ICTR Statute]. For a
version of the ICTY Statute incorporating all subsequent amendments, see
Amended Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal, http://www.un.org/
icty/legaldoc-e/basic/statut/statll-2004.htm. For a version of the ICTR Statute
incorporating all subsequent amendments, see Statute of the International Tribunal
for Rwanda, http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/itr.htm.
4. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 183/9 (1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute].
5. IST Statute, supra note 2, arts. 10-14, 43 I.L.M. at 236-41.
6. See generally Revised Version of Iraqi Special Tribunal Rules of Procedure
and Evidence, entered into force Dec. 23, 2004 [hereinafter IST Rules of
Procedure], available at http://www.iraqispecialtribunal.org/en/laws/rules.htm.
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distinctions. Thus, we see in the. IST Statute and IST Rules
provisions that there will be no immunity granted for official
positions (there were such immunities under prior Iraqi penal law);
the Nuremberg obedience orders defense is rejected, and the
principle of command responsibility is accepted.
Article 20 of the IST law sets out the usual rights of the accused
found in war crimes tribunal charters: rights to public trial (except
for those parts where victim protection or national security deem
otherwise, an exception found in all these tribunals); rights to a
presumption of innocence; notice of charges; to counsel, assigned if
the accused cannot pay for his own; to prompt trial, to mount a
defense and to obtain witnesses; to confront evidence against him;
and not to be compelled to testify against himself or to have such
refusal enter into any determination of guilt (again a change in Iraqi
law which allowed a court to draw inferences from a defendant's
refusal to answer its questions).7
The court is also required to write a reasoned opinion for its
decision, and there is a right to appeal a sentence or conviction to an
appeals chamber.8 There are guarantees against being tried for the
same acts twice (unless the first trial was a sham).9 The IST Rules
require pretrial disclosure of the prosecutor's evidence (any
exceptions must be by judicial order) and the prosecutor is mandated
to disclose any material exculpatory or in mitigation of guilt to the
accused. 10 The IST Rules stress the independence of the judges who
must take no instructions from other parts of the government (or
anyone else) as well as their duty to refrain from deciding cases in
which they have financial or personal interests or past involvement."
A. VOICED SHORTCOMINGS IN THE IST FRAMEWORK
Human rights groups such as Amnesty International and Human
Rights Watch have, however, objected to the Iraqi Special Tribunal
on several bases, some grounded in human rights doctrine, some in
7. IST Statute, supra note 2, art. 20(b)-(d), 43 I.L.M. at 244.
8. Id. arts. 23(b), 25, 43 I.L.M. at 245-46.
9. Id. art. 30(a)-(b), 43 I.L.M. at 247.
10. IST Rules of Procedure, supra note 6, Rs. 61-62.
11. Id. R. 11.
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what appear to be more pragmatic concerns that Iraqi judges are just
not up to the job of deciding complex, prolonged cases involving
international humanitarian law doctrines to which they have only
recently been exposed in "crash" training courses. 12 The deal-breaker
for most of the groups is the allowance of the death penalty,
something which, incidentally, the American advisers did not want
(Paul Bremer suspended it while he was in charge), but the Iraqis
demanded. This inclusion brought on the condemnation of the United
Nations, as well as the European Union members and a myriad of
international NGOs. The omission of the death penalty may or may
not be a human rights canon, but for these purposes it is treated as
such. Thus the U.N., most EU countries (except the UK) and NGOs
have refused to provide any assistance to the IST, and the U.N. has
forbidden its personnel serving in other tribunals from giving advice
or training to native Iraqi IST judges. (The ICC happily has not so
enjoined its people.)
This boycott has some ironic effects insofar as any goal of
international humanitarian law bringing in its wake human rights
advances in hostile countries. The IST Statute requires that in each
branch of the Tribunal-investigative, trial and appeal-as well as in
the offices of the Prosecutor and Defense, there be appointed non-
Iraqi advisers and observers to provide non-partisan, expert advice
and recommendations, 3 particularly in the area of international
norms. Thus far (except for the American advisers on-site) only one
such adviser from the UK is serving in that capacity. One must
wonder if this "to the wall" approach, cutting off a potential source
of international law advice, ends up being counterproductive to the
introduction of human rights law into the court.
Similarly, another article in the IST Statute tells Iraqi judges they
may resort to relevant decisions of international courts as persuasive
authority for their interpretations of the international crimes of
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. 4 Of course,
those decisions are still being translated into Arabic and even if that
12. See, e.g.,. Amnesty Int'l, Iraqi Special Tribunal-Fair Trials Not
Guaranteed, May 12, 2005.
13. IST Statute, supra note 2, arts. 6(b), 7(n), 43 I.L.M. at 233-34.
14. Id. art. 17(b), 43 I.L.M. at 243.
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monumental task 5 is completed in time for some of the trials
(Saddam Hussein's first trial began in October 2005), the length and
complexity of many of the decisions will likely present a high hurdle
for novitiate Iraqi judges; international advisers would have been
compelling assets for them to consult. This, too, has human rights
consequences for, in fact, it is the jurisprudence of the ad hoc
tribunals that has in effect joined international humanitarian law and
human rights at the hip. Rarely is there an international court
decision that interprets international humanitarian law in a way that
does not encompass relevant human rights law as well. A prime
example is the wholesale adoption of the International Covenant of
Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR") 16 guarantees to the accused in
international humanitarian law as practiced in the ad hoc tribunals. I
am told that the most recent version of the Iraqi Tribunal law permits
the judges to bring down judgments based on national law, such as
murder, instead of a war crime or crime against humanity. Given
inadequate access to international expertise, Iraqi judges may be
drawn to this path.
Other parts of the IST Statute and Rules call for consideration of
international law-both international humanitarian law and human
rights law. The law instructs judges in imposing penalties for the
universal crimes to consider "relevant international precedent."' 7
While this instruction is necessarily vague given the lack of refined
sentencing criteria in the ad hoc tribunals and even in the ICC law
(which is somewhat more detailed on sentencing), the reference
would still be the basis for ruling out bizarre or cruel and inhumane
punishments-apart from the death penalty-surely an area human
rights activists care about. Finally, the IST Rules require the
Administrator in charge of detention to issue rules that preserve
15. Compare Nathan J. Brown & Clark B. Lombardi, The Supreme
Constitutional Court of Egypt on Islamic Law, Veiling and Civil Rights: An
Annotated Translation of Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt Case No. 8 of
Judicial Year 17 (May 18, 1996), 21 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 437, 439 (2006), which
reviews the unique challenges in translating case law from Arabic to English, in
light of the linguistic distinctions, and inherent stylistic and expressive differences.
16. G.A. Res. 2200, at 52, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc.
A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966).
17. IST Statute, supra note 2, art. 24(e), 43 I.L.M. at 246.
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"human rights" in detention, 8 again a place where non-Iraqi advisers
might have been quite significant.
B. BEYOND THE DEATH PENALTY
In all fairness, critics of the Iraqi Tribunal expressed several
concerns other than the death penalty. Yet, after participating in
dialogues between the critics and the Iraqi judges and prosecutors
(and their American supporters), I was left with the impression that
these other items could well have been resolved. In some cases, the
critics (primarily NGOs) were using a "super-standard" that
characterized virtually all operational facets of the ad hoc and ICC
courts as human rights requirements, and perhaps ignored in some
cases the fact that those tribunals themselves had some of the
deficiencies they found unacceptable in the case of Iraq. That point
notwithstanding, there is no doubt that a few areas the critics cite are
cause for concern. I will now consider the most meritorious of those
concerns.
1. The Presence of Counsel
The IST Statute and Rules insist that an accused must have
counsel present when questioned by an investigative judge.' 9 But
they do not say anything about police questioning before that
appearance, or generally about access to counsel in detention (which
can last up to 180 days). The Iraqi judges assured us that under their
own national law, police had to bring an arrestee before the judge
promptly and that counsel had ready access to the client thereafter.
However, without linguistic access to the Iraqi code or knowledge of
whether or how it is adhered to in practice, human rights activists are
right to worry. Further, one has also to ask whether Miranda"° is
tantamount to international human rights law even though the rules
of both the ICTY and ICC provide counsel at questioning in all
stages of investigation and prosecution for an accused or targeted
suspect.
18. See IST Rules of Procedure, supra note 6, R. 30(3).
19. Id. R. 46; IST Statute, supra note 2, art. 18(c), 43 I.L.M. at 243.
20. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2006] 547
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2. Evidentiary Concerns
The kinds of evidence that may be used at trial has also posed a
problem for opponents. Although the formula for admissible
evidence-anything that is relevant and probative21-parallels that
used in the other tribunals, the civil law procedures put a new cast on
it. They envision a nonpublic investigation supervised by an
investigative judge who looks for both incriminating and exculpatory
evidence, interviews witnesses and seeks out evidence in
proceedings that do not include the defendant, although the judge
may allow the defense to participate and offer evidence.22 At the end
of the investigation stage, the judge prepares a dossier and decides
whether to indict. If he does so, the dossier becomes the centerpiece
of the ensuing trial although both sides may call and examine and
cross-examine witnesses in this second stage. But the dossier itself
may contain evidence which the defense has not been able to contest
at the time of original questioning, but which the trial judges can
consider. This is of course a staple of a different mode of trial,
unfamiliar to Anglo-Saxon procedure but probably not rising to a
human rights issue. Our own hearsay rules are not enshrined in
international law and indeed are not uniformly followed in the other
tribunals. Actually, the IST Rules have more explicit restraints on
hearsay than in other tribunals in that they provide that admission of
hearsay evidence should take account of the availability of the
declarant to testify and circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness.23
One omission from the IST Statute and Rules has provoked
criticism and should be easily altered if, as the Iraqi judges proclaim,
it is already a staple of basic Iraqi law. That is the need for an
explicit guarantee against the use of evidence which has been
obtained by torture or inhumane treatment. The Iraqis say their code
now makes the use of torture to induce confessions illegal-but it is
unclear if that prevents use of the confession at trial. The current IST
Rules say that admissibility should depend on "whether the means by
which the evidence [is] obtained casts substantial doubt on its
21. IST Rules of Procedure, supra note 6, R. 79(3).
22. Id. Rs. 42-43.
23. Id. R. 79(5)(3).
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reliability; '24 this formulation falls short of the other tribunals' ban
against evidence that is "inimical to the integrity" of the court. This
gap should be easily remediable given the will and incentive to do
SO.
2 5
3. Judicial Impartiality
The most troublesome aspect of the IST procedures that, in my
view, implicates human rights-the most important right of all in any
trial-is the right to independent and impartial judges. Although that
right appears in the law, it is common knowledge that members of
the Prime Minister's cabinet embarked on a campaign to dismiss
nineteen of the judges and key staff and to bring the court under the
wing of the Judicial Council, a body dominated by the Executive and
allegedly used in Saddam Hussein's regime to control the courts.
They did so on the basis that the targeted judges and personnel had at
one time been members of the Baath Party and the IST Statute
requires that no judicial officer or staff member could have been
affiliated with the former Baath party.26 (In other courts only higher-
level officials of the Baath Party have been disqualified from judicial
positions.) Many of the IST judges (and their American advisers)
saw this as a direct assault on the new court's independence although
some of the older judges did not. Since a parliamentarian amendment
is necessary to delete this ban (and, incidentally, here the NGOs
agree that total party membership disqualification is unjust
24. Id. R. 79(5)(4).
25. Some complain that the IST Rules do not explicitly require the reasonable
doubt standard for guilt. See, e.g., Hum. Rts. Watch, The Iraqi Special Tribunal,
Rules of Procedure and Evidence Missing Key Protections, Apr. 22, 2005.
However, there is an explicit guarantee of the presumption of innocence which
international law has declared to implicitly mean reasonable doubt. The Iraqis say
that is their standard, and indeed neither the ICTY Charter nor the black letter law
of the ICCPR use the reasonable doubt phrase, though the Commentary to Article
14 of the ICCPR uses it and the ICTY Rules proclaim it. There is also an
ambiguity concerning whether trial in absentia is permitted. Article 20 of the IST
Statute guarantees an accused a right to a trial in his presence, but Rule 57 of the
Iraqi Rules says he can be tried according to Iraqi law, which appears to allow trial
in absentia under some circumstances. In any case, it is not clear that trial in
absentia is a human rights violation per se or in all circumstances and is practiced
in many Continental countries.
26. IST Statute, supra note 2, art. 33, 43 I.L.M. at 248.
2006] 549
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discrimination as compared to a case-by-case assessment), a critical
reevaluation of the IST would have been in order if a majority of
judges and key staff had been dismissed and replaced on this ground.
For the moment, the problem seems to have gone away, due to
behind-the-scenes lobbying and negotiations.
4. Assassination as a True Impediment
An even greater obstacle to the trials has arisen since the first one
began in the autumn of 2005. Two defense counsel have been
assassinated, another severely injured, and a "plot" to kill the judges
unearthed (one investigative judge was killed months earlier). The
killings provoked an initial boycott by the defense attorneys until
negotiations satisfied their understandable desire for enhanced
security. Still, the question looms whether international justice and
human rights can survive in the midst of a violent insurgency on-site
or whether, as with the ICTY, removal to a more distant site is
necessary.
C. A SIGNIFICANT OPPORTUNITY THAT SHOULD
NOT BE OVERLOOKED
These are my summary conclusions on Iraqi war crimes trials. The
basic IST Statute and Rules-with a few exceptions-follow
international humanitarian law tenets closely, at least in the English
version I have seen. A significant opportunity for international input
in human rights as well as international humanitarian law advances
in Iraq may be lost because of the dispute, principally over the death
penalty. International humanitarian law and human rights have been
melded in the other war crimes tribunals and that meld could
constructively be brought into Iraqi law and practice. The IST
judges-dozens of them-will rejoin the pool of regular judges when
the Tribunal is over and could significantly impact national criminal
procedures through their experience on the Tribunal. In countries like
Rwanda and Sierra Leone, there has been a much noted and lamented
gap between the quality of justice in the international war crimes
tribunal and the regular courts. In the Iraqi type of national court, the
gap has a better chance of being closed. We know already it is
technically possible to try war crimes consistent with international
humanitarian law's substantive definitions while avoiding many of
[21:541550
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the human rights oriented procedures used in the ad hoc ICC
tribunals. That has indeed been the chief allegation leveled at the
U.S. military commission tribunals in Guantanamo. The international
tribunal experience thus far has been different, however, in joining
the two bodies of law. Personally, I fear any continued boycott of
Iraq's Tribunal along with its own politically based fight for
independence from Executive control may result in a missed
opportunity to further the melding of international humanitarian law
and human rights in international criminal law. I hope I am wrong.
1I. CAMBODIA
After many years of frustrating on-again-off-again negotiating
with the United Nations, Cambodia arrived at an agreed format for a
tribunal to try the surviving leaders of the 1975-1979 Khmer Rouge
regime that oversaw the starvation, torture, execution, and mass
displacement of more than two million Cambodian citizens. The
Cambodian Parliament subsequently passed a law creating an
Extraordinary Chamber ("KRT") to prosecute and try the most senior
and most responsible perpetrators of these atrocities, by now
consisting of only a dozen and a half aged men, most unlikely to last
many more years. 7
A. THE KHMER ROUGE TRIBUNAL AND THE
EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS LAW
The KRT will be a national court employing Cambodian law
except where inconsistent with international law or where
international law is necessary to fill in lacunae in national law. It will
have a majority of Cambodian judges, but a minority of judges
picked by the government from a list of U.N. nominees (three
Cambodian and two international judges in the trial court; four
27. Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of
Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of
Democratic Kampuchea (2001) (Cambodia), as amended by NS/RKM/1004/006
(Oct. 27, 2004) (unofficial translation, Council of Jurists) [hereinafter
Extraordinary Chambers Law], available at http://www.cambodia.gov.kh/
krt/pdfs/KR%20Law%20as%20amended%2027%200ct%202004%2OEng.pdf, see
also Khmer Rouge Trials, G.A. Res. 228, 57th Sess., U.N. Doc. AIRES/57/228
(Feb. 27, 2003).
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Cambodian and three international judges in the appeals court).28
Like Iraq, it will use the civil law mode of trial and there will be
international and Cambodian co-prosecutors and co-investigative
judges. No judicial decision of any consequence can be made
without the consent of at least one international judge. 29 If the co-
prosecutors or co-investigative judges disagree on an indictment, a
panel of five judges will decide. If they cannot agree, the case will go
forward. The KRT expects to try only a dozen or so high-level
leaders and to terminate within three years. Its internal regulations
are still being drafted by a Cambodian Task Force. Cambodia has no
death penalty so the Tribunal will impose only maximum life
sentences and minimum five-year prison sentences. Foreign donors,
principally Japan, will provide the major financing. The United
States is not opposed to the Tribunal, but has not done much of
anything to actively support it. The trials will be held on a former
military base on the outskirts of Phnom Penh.30
The Cambodian KRT law has all the required ingredients for U.N.
approval; judges are required to be independent and to take no
instructions; they must have experience in criminal law or
international law, including international humanitarian law and
human rights law.31 The accused has the usual ICCPR guarantees of
public trials, against self-incrimination, and presumption of
innocence (Cambodia is a signatory to the ICCPR as well as the
28. Extraordinary Chambers Law, supra note 27, arts. 10-11.
29. Due to the composition of the courts, with the Trial Chamber having three
Cambodian judges and two international judges, and the Supreme Court Chamber
having four Cambodian Judges and three international judges, all decisions will
require at least one international judge vote. Id. art. 14(1) (requiring the affirmative
vote of at least four judges in the Trial Chamber and at least five judges in the
Supreme Court Chamber). But see id. art. 46 (permitting the appointment of
additional domestic judges in the extraordinary circumstance that suitable
international candidates are not available or offered after the exhaustion of a long
set of procedural requirements).
30. Because it is following Cambodian law, the KRT has a peculiar problem. In
regular Cambodian courts, victims can process their own claims for reparations in
the context of the criminal case. How to do this for cases involving thousands of
victims presents a problem, especially since reparations can only come from the
perpetrators' assets unless a special victims fund is created.
31. Id. art. 10.
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Rome Statute).3 2 The definitions of crimes to be tried-genocide,
crimes against humanity, war crimes-parallel the other tribunals;33
additionally the court can try destruction of cultural property and
crimes against internationally protected persons. It will cost $20
million a year and local NGOs are involved in locating witnesses and
evidence and doing outreach to inform citizens of the tribunals and
encourage their attendance and oversight.
Forging the connection between international humanitarian law
and human rights in Cambodia is not so much a matter of legislation
as it is of enforcement. A perusal of Cambodian criminal law-on
paper-will demonstrate that most of the human rights that
advocates believe should be involved in the criminal process already
exist, in theory. The KRT law gives suspects the right to counsel
including any interrogation during the investigative stage.34 The law
also says the trial court shall exercise its jurisdiction in accord with
international standards of justice, fairness, and due process as set out
in the ICCPR.35 And no amnesty will be given to anyone convicted
under the law (though the validity of a prior amnesty against one of
the leading perpetrators convicted in a "sham" trial of 1979 by the
Peoples Revolutionary Court is left up to the current court).
Cambodia is a joiner-it is a party to the Rome Statute,36
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination ("CERD"),37 Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women ("CEDAW"),38 the
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
32. Id. art. 35 (noting how the guarantees given to the accused are construed in
accordance with Article 14 of the ICCPR).
33. There are minor differences, for instance, in the genocide definition which
has transposed "as such" to "such as," thereby changing its scope, but this is
reported to be a translation error. See id. arts. 4-5. The definition omits incitement
to genocide as a crime, but retains conspiracy which the ICC definition has
dropped.
34. Id. art. 24.
35. Id. art. 33 (referring specifically to ICCPR Articles 14 and 15).
36. Rome Statute, supra note 4.
37. G.A. Res. 2106, at 47, U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., Supp. No. 14, U.N. Doc.
A/6014 (Dec. 21, 1965).
38. G.A. Res. 180, at 33, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/34/80
(Jan. 22, 1980).
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Treatment or Punishment,3 9 the Convention of the Rights of the
Child,4° and many more international agreements. Cambodian law
excludes evidence if gathered illegally. The KRT law provides
explicitly for defense challenges to evidence even during the
investigative stage; conversations between lawyer and client are
guaranteed confidentiality and can not be monitored; treatment of
detainees is to be in conformity with U.N. standards; confessions
obtained by duress are null and void. Police detention is limited to
forty-eight hours before an appearance is required before the
investigating judge. Guilt is tied specifically to a "beyond reasonable
doubt" standard. The one human right in some question is whether
any inference can be drawn from a suspect's refusal to answer
questions of the court.
B. CONCERNS ABOUT FAIR TRIALS
Human rights advocates inside and outside of Cambodia are
worried-with some justification-about the capacity of the KRT to
provide fair trials. It is no secret that the reputation of the regular
courts for impartial justice (and independence from the Executive
Branch) is badly tarnished; seemingly blatant violations have
occurred right up to the present day, including removal and
reassignment of cases from troublesome judges to more compliant
ones. Human Rights Watch has concluded, "The judicial system
remain[s] extremely weak and generally unable to deliver justice to
those whose human rights [are] violated."' Security officials have
been accused of torturing detainees; prison conditions are poor; the
media is subject to intimidation; elections are often manipulated and
accompanied by political violence.
The operation of a legitimate war crimes court as part of a
judiciary with such fundamental problems will take considerable
effort. If the provisions of the KRT law are scrupulously honored, it
can happen-but, again, that will highlight the endemic chasm
39. G.A. Res. 46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/39/51
(1984).
40. G.A. Res. 25, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/44/49
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41. Hum. Rts. Watch, World Report 2003, at 208, available at
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between internationalized and purely domestic courts in deficient
systems. Cultural change does not come easily, especially if there is
no will for it at the top levels of government, and questions have
been raised about that will in Cambodian cases.
What it will take to demonstrate the will in Cambodia's cases is
first the appointment of Cambodian judges who refuse to indulge in
either bribes or governmental instruction. The announcement that the
KRT judges will receive $65,000 a year (an astronomical sum in
Cambodia where regular judges get several hundred dollars a month)
should act as somewhat of a buffer against economic seduction in
that regard. The prosecutor, who drives the engine of investigation
and case presentation, must of course also be independent and in
control of the judicial police who will execute the investigations. But
the international presence in the form of tiebreaker judges nominated
by the U.N. is absolutely critical; these judges must not only be
competent but they must be aggressively watchful and willing to
speak up when any signs of government or other outside control
appear. Although the principal defense counsel must be Cambodian,
international lawyers may assist them and a debate is now waging as
to whether the out-of-country lawyers can actually speak in court or
only through the Cambodian lawyers. If international lawyers are
freed up to do the latter, they can act as vital overseers of the
integrity of the process. NGOs-Cambodian and international-must
also be active court watchers and mobilizers of the citizenry to keep
the court front and center in the public's eye.
Cambodia presents a unique challenge to the advance of
international humanitarian law in countries with deficient judicial
systems. There cannot and will not be an international court or ICC
availability for every post-war conflict or transitional government.
And when countries like Cambodia finally get to the point of
agreeing to an acceptable law governing trial of these universal
crimes, how should the international community react? Help them
until it is clear they are not acting in good faith, or insist on basic and
realistically unlikely reforms in the general human rights conditions
before such a court will be assisted?
It is also noteworthy that the kind of problems confronted in
Cambodia are in effect a preview of what the ICC may frequently
face in its own complementarity decisions about whether a State is
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able or willing to do its own cleanup work in trying international
crimes, and whether or at what stage the international community
will help or abandon them. The reality of future international justice
may be at stake.
